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This paper presents and compares three heuristics for the combinatorial auction
problem. Besides a simple greedy (SG) mechanism, two metaheuristics, a sim-
ulated annealing (SA), and a genetic algorithm (GA) approach are developed
which use the combinatorial auction process to find an allocation with maximal
revenue for the auctioneer. The performance of these three heuristics is evaluated
in the context of a price controlled resource allocation process designed for the
control and provision of distributed information services. Comparing the SG and
SA method shows that depending on the problem structure the performance of
the SA is up to 20% higher than the performance of the simple greedy alloca-
tion method. The proposed GA approach, using a random key encoding, results
in a further improvement of the solution quality. Although the metaheuristic ap-
proaches result in higher search performance, the computational effort in terms of
used CPU time is higher in comparison to the simple greedy mechanism. How-
ever, the absolute overall computation time is low enough to enable real-time
execution in the considered IS application domain.
1 Introduction
Price-controlled resource allocation in IT systems is a common research topic since
the use of distributed information systems became more widespread [1]. One way
of achieving an optimal allocation of the resources needed to provide information
services is to use auction mechanisms [2]. A crucial problem in this context is the
nonlinear valuation of the requested resource bundles due to technological interdepen-
dencies. These interdependencies can be addressed by the formulation of appropriate
bid prices for resource bundles depending on the usability of a specic factor com-
bination in the service provision process. The allocation of the constrained resources
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is then accomplished by a combinatorial auction (CA). The underlying combinatorial
auction problem (CAP) is NP-hard [3]. Therefore, CAP-algorithms dealing with time
critical applications, such as the provision of distributed IT services, rely on the use of
heuristics and metaheuristics.
In this work we develop three (meta)heuristics for the CAP and evaluate their
performance in a price controlled resource allocation scenario (PCRAS). The sce-
nario emulates resource requirements occurring, for instance in connection with the
provision of distributed information services and information production (ISIP), such
as the simultaneous usage of network and computing capacity to enable web-based
video conferencing and telecommunication applications between corporations. Alter-
natively, the supply and accounting of video-on-demand has similar application prop-
erties. The time-delayed transfer of data, which is collected during daily business
activities in large corporations, could be seen as a further instance of an IT prob-
lem where optimal automated resource allocation is necessary. As a rst solution we
present a simple greedy heuristic that is based on a bundle price-resource load ratio.
Based on this bid selection strategy we also propose a simulated annealing (SA) al-
gorithm and a genetic algorithm (GA) using the random key encoding. Both methods
improve the solution quality for the CAP.
2 Solving the Combinatorial Auction Problem
Performing CAs in a PCRAS context means that a bidder agent ai submits bid bundles
bi,j which include the requests qi,j(rs, tn) for the resources rs of type s in a specic
quantity q at a particular point of time tn. i denotes the number of agents, j the number
of bids per agent, and l = i ∗ j is the total number of bids.
Due to the bidders time-dependent nonlinear valuation of the resource allocation,
especially the complementary property of the bidders utility function vi({bi,j}), the
CAP is NP-hard [3, 4]. For the PCARS the valuation of two bids (j = 1, 2) submitted
by an agent i is super-additive if technological complementarities exist:1
vi({bi,1}) + vi({bi,2}) < vi({bi,1} ∪ {bi,2}) (1)
The CAP is often denoted as the winner determination problem (WDP) according to
the traditional auctioneers task of identifying the winner. The formal description of
the CAP could be considered as a special variant of the weighted set packing problem
(WSPP) [5] and is formulated as:
1The bidder (producer) applies for a particular combination of resources at a specific point of time
tn. If not all requested resources are assigned to him, the partial acquisition of the resources has much
less value because of production delays or even production failures. This results in the higher than linear













qi,j(r, t) xi,j ≤ qmax(r, t),
where r ∈ {1, . . . , S}, t ∈ {1, . . . , N} and
J∑
j=1
xi,j ≤ 1, where i ∈ {1, . . . , I}.
(2)
Resources: r1...S ∈ R
Time slots: t1...N ∈ T
Resource requests: qi,j(r, t) ∈ N
Price for bid bi,j: pi,j ∈ R+
Acceptance variable: xi,j ∈ {0,1}
Bid j of agent i: bi,j ∈ B
The goal is to maximize the auctioneers income. qmax(r, t) is the maximum ca-
pacity of resources at time t available to the auctioneer and B is the set of all bids bi,j .
Furthermore, we refer to the set of accepted bids as Bacc (with Bacc ⊆ B).
The search for an optimal, or at least near optimal, solution to the CAP is mainly
done by approaches like integer programming [6, 7] or branch and bound [8, 9]. Due
to the high computational effort of such approaches, heuristics based on greedy alloca-
tion strategies are employed to solve the CAP, accepting a trade-off between solution
quality and computational effort. Mostly, a simple greedy CA algorithm (SG-CAA)
consists of two steps:
• According to a revenue oriented criteria (e.g. average price per bid-bundle,
single-item respectively) submitted bids are sorted in an ordered list.
• CA allocation is done by adding ordered bids from the list as long as they are
not ruled out by bids which are already included.
The allocation quality achieved with the SG-CAA usually depends on the sorting
criteria and the bidder’s utility function. Many approaches combine greedy allocation
with more sophisticated heuristics like SA [10]. [11] presented an SA-based approach
to solve the CAP in a supply chain setting, where contracts for task allocation are
negotiated based on temporal and precedence constraints. The use of a GA as a meta-
heuristic to solve the CAP is proposed by [12]. In this work tasks are matched to
a service provider using a tness function based on criteria such as bandwidth and
server capacity. Other GA approaches addressed the WSPP to nd an optimal solution
for real-world problems like ight crew scheduling [13]. [14] implemented a parallel
GA, which uses up to 128 subpopulations. Although this approach is able to handle
a large number of bundles, the algorithm has difculties when dealing with highly
constrained set partitioning problems.
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3 Price-Controlled Resource Allocation Scenario
In the following section we propose a general price-controlled resource allocation
scenario for evaluating and comparing the performance of the three heuristics.
A request bi,j is formulated as a 2-dimensional bid matrix (BM ) describing which
resource2 ri, where i ∈ {1, . . . , S}, is requested at time tn, where tn ∈ {1, . . . , N}. A
simple example for a PCRAS request is presented in Table 1. Each entry of the BM
denotes the amount qi,j(r, t) of resource units needed. To every bid matrix a bid price
p belongs which indicates the bidders willingness-to-pay.
After describing the load request on the demand side, the resource allocation on
the supply side should be modeled. In our scenario this is done by employing an
allocation matrix (AM ), which has the same structure as BM . Integrating a task into
the schedule of the resource provider is done simply by aggregating the current BM
into the AM . A violation of a resource load constraint can be detected by comparing
the AM with the constraint qmax (which is equal for all resource types over all time
slots).











pfact is a random decimal number from the interval [pmin, pmax] and qbmax denotes
the maximum resource load that can be requested by a bidder for a single BM -element
qi,j(r, t). In our three test instances each entry in the BM is occupied with probability
ptso. This means, bi,j = 0 with probability 1 − ptso. If bi,j 6= 0, bi,j is uniformly
distributed (in our test scenarios bi,j is uniformly distributed between 1 and 3).
In our work we use three different test instances. Each of them is a representative
instance of relevant real-world scenarios:
• Unstructured Bids: The st type of BMs contains single resource requests
with a maximum bid length of one time slot associated with a specic resource
load. A BM depicting this bid type is shown in Table 1.
• Substructured Bids: In a more realistic environment, bidder agents require
resources with the same intensity for a longer period of time (up to lmax slots).
This results in continuous bids of varying length, called substructured bids. An
example is shown in Table 2.
• Structured Bids: Some application cases require resources to be allocated syn-
chronously within shifts. The coherent bids must not cross the shift limits, but
may have different constant load intensities for the particular resource types dur-
ing the shift. A sample for such a structured BM is displayed in Table 3.
2Computing power, volatile computer memory, non-volatile storage capacity, and data transfer band-




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
r1 1 2 3 1 2 2
r2 3 1 2 3 1 3 1
r3 1 1 1 2
r4 1 1 1 3 1
Table 1: Example of an unstructured PCRAS bid matrix
resource
time slot t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
r1 3 3 3 2 2 2
r2 2 2 2 1 1 1
r3 1 1 2 2 2
r4 1 1 1 3 3 3
Table 2: Example of a substructured PCRAS bid matrix
resource
time slot t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
r1 3 3 3 2 2 2
r2 2 2 2 3 3 1
r3 1 1 1 1 1 2
r4 1 1 1 2 2 3
Table 3: Example of a structured PCRAS bid matrix
bid nr. 2 6 4 5 1 3
res. load 111 141 133 85 126 93
bid price 294 344 251 132 157 104
pi,j/q
ovl
i,j 2.65 2.44 1.89 1.55 1.25 1.12
Table 4: List of bids
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4 Three Heuristics for the Combinatorial Auction Problem
In the following section algorithms for the solution of the CAP in the ISIP resource
bundle allocation context are presented. As mentioned above, they are based on three
common types of heuristics: SG, SA and GA.
4.1 Simple Greedy CA Algorithm
We start with the presentation of a simple greedy CA algorithm (SG-CAA). The SG-
CAA implementation uses a maxf -function to sort the bids according to the ratio
fi,j = pi,j/q
ovl
i,j (price over the overall resource load). See Table 4 for an example.
The SG-CAA iteratively inserts a bid to the accepted bid set Bacc if no other agent’s
bid is already in Bacc (XOR-condition), and if the resource load constraint is not vio-
lated (compare step 4):
1. Let i = 0, Bacc be an (initially) empty set of accepted bids, and rg be a sorted
bid list according to the above mentioned criteria (compare Table 4). All bids
bi,j are labeled from 1 to l.
2. Let v be the number at the ith position of the permutation rg and av the corre-
sponding bidder agent.
3. If Bacc contains a bid of av continue with step 6.
4. If the insertion of the bid with number v in Bacc would violate the resource load
constraint (∑i,j qi,j(r, t)xi,j < qmax∀r∈R,t∈T ) continue with step 6.
5. Insert the bid with number v in Bacc.
6. Stop, if i > l.
7. Increment i and continue with step 2.
The results of the SG-CAA are used as a benchmark for the algorithms presented
in the next sections.
4.2 Simulated Annealing CA Algorithm
Due to its simple functionality the greedy strategy implemented in the SG-CAA is not
very promising. One possibility to enhance the efciency of the greedy strategy is to
apply a stochastic improvement process on the initial allocation, trying to remove sub-
optimal bids from the AM and to replace them by bids which result in a higher reward
for the auctioneer. We want to use a simulated annealing approach, which is based
on the original proposal of [15]. The tness function used is the expected income of
the auctioneer. The acceptance probability of a worse solution is controlled by the
temperature T .
The simulated annealing CA algorithm (SA-CAA) proceeds as follows: Starting
with an empty AM , the auctioneer tries to add a bid which is submitted by an agent
that has none of its bids accepted. If the resulting allocation AM violates the resource
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allocation constraint, the new allocation is discarded and another bid is tried. The
tness of an allocation is the auctioneer’s income.
Besides adding and removing bids from the AM , the SA algorithm can also handle
both operations simultaneously to obtain a new solution. The probability of accepting
a new solution Pacc is determined by the metropolis probability [16], which depends







∆E denotes the change in the auctioneers income due to the insertion/removal step.
The SA-CAA algorithm used for our experiments can be summarized as:
1. Let i = 0, Bacc be an empty set of accepted bids, and bout and bin be empty.
2. With a probability of 0.25 continue with step 4.
3. Select a bid bin randomly from B\Bacc. Continue with step 5 with a probability
of 0.33.
4. Select a bid bout randomly from Bacc.
5. If the insertion of bin and removal of bout from Bacc would violate the resource
load constraint, continue with step 9.
6. If the insertion of bin and removal of bout from Bacc would increase the auction-
eer’s revenue, or if random(0, 1) ≤ Pacc (∆Ei), continue with step 8.
7. Insert bin into Bacc and remove bout from Bacc.
8. If i > maxSteps stop optimization.
9. If i mod 100 = 0, decrease temperature.
10. Increment i, let bout and bin be empty, and continue with step 2.
When using SA, the starting temperature and cooling rate are essential for the
performance of the algorithm. However, optimizing these parameters manually seems
to be unpromising. Therefore, we decided to employ a temperature control technique
proposed by [17]. This determines the starting temperature such that the algorithm












yielding T = 5/N ∗
∑N
i=1 ∆Ei after Taylor expansion.
The annealing process is executed in stages awaiting the occurrence of a thermo-
dynamic equilibrium indicated by a constant
∑N
i=1 ∆Ei/N . The temperature between
successive annealing stages is decreased by a cooling factor α = 0.995, which is a suit-
able rule of thumb. The annealing process can be stopped if lowering the temperature
does not signicantly change the average energy difference.
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Figure 1 shows the increasing tness of the SA-CAA during the annealing pro-
cess averaged over 50 runs. The regression line has the typical shape of an annealing
process. Initially, the temperature is high. Therefore, there is a random walk and
no increase in the tness of the solutions. This is followed by an accelerating, and
later decelerating, increase in tness. Finally, when the temperature is low enough the
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Fitness (auctioneer’s income) when using SA-CAA for unstructured bids
4.3 Genetic CA Algorithm
The third approach is a standard generational GA using the random key (RK) encod-
ing. The RK encoding was introduced by [18] and can advantageously be used for
ordering and scheduling problems if the relative ordering of tasks is important. Using
the RKs for the combinatorial auction problem allows us to incorporate the resource
load constraint into the random key encoding and to generate and process only valid
solutions. Therefore, no additional penalties for invalid solutions are necessary.
Later, the encoding was also proposed for single and multiple machine scheduling,
vehicle routing, resource allocation, quadratic assignments, and traveling salesperson
problems [19]. Norman and Bean [20] rened this approach [21] and applied it to
multiple machine scheduling problems [22]. An overview of using random keys for
scheduling problems can be found in the (unpublished) PhD thesis of Norman [23].
Norman, Smith, and Arapoglu [24, 25] applied random keys to facility layout prob-
lems. Rothlauf et al. [26] used random keys for the representation of trees.
The RK encoding uses random numbers for the encoding of a solution. A key
sequence of length l, where l is the number of bids bi,j , is a sequence of l distinct
real numbers (keys). The values are initially chosen at random, are oating numbers
between zero and one, and are only subsequently modied by mutation and crossover.
An example for a key sequence of length l = 4 is r = (0.07, 0.75, 0.56, 0.67). Of
importance for the interpretation of the key sequence is the position and value of the
keys in the sequence. If we assume that Zl = {0, . . . , l−1} then a permutation σ can be
8
dened as a surjective function σ : Zl → Zl. For any key sequence r = r0, . . . , rl−1,
the permutation σr of r is dened as the sequence with elements (σr)i = rσ(i). The
permutation rs corresponding to a key sequence r of length l is the permutation σ
such that σr is decreasing (i.e., i < j ⇒ (σr)i > (σr)j). The ordering corresponding
to a key sequence r of length l is the sequence σ(0), . . . , σ(l − 1), where σ is the
permutation corresponding to r.
We want to give a brief example for the construction of the permutation rs of bids
from the key sequence r. The positions of the keys in the key sequence r must be
ordered according to the values of the keys in descending order. In our example we
have to identify the position of the highest value in the key sequence (0.75 at position
2). The next highest value is 0.67 at position 4. We continue ordering the complete
sequence and get the permutation rs = 2 → 4 → 3 → 1. In the context of our
CA problem this permutation can be interpreted as a list of bids that are considered
sequentially by the auctioneer. (The auctioneer starts by accepting bid 2, then accepts
bid 4, bid 3, and bid 1). From a key sequence of length l, we can always construct a
permutation of l numbers (bids). Every bid number between 1 and l (resp. 0 and l−1)
appears in the permutation only once as the position of each key is unique.
In a next step the accepted bids are calculated from the permutation rs representing
an ordered list of bids:
1. Let i = 0, Bacc be an (initially) empty set of accepted bids, and rs the permu-
tation of length z that can be constructed from the key sequence r. All bids bi,j
are labeled from 1 to z.
2. Let v be the number at the ith position of the permutation rs and av the corre-
sponding bidder agent.
3. If Bacc already contains a bid of av continue with step 6.
4. If the insertion of the bid with number v in Bacc would violate the resource load
constraint, continue with step 6.
5. Insert the bid with number v in Bacc.
6. Stop, if i > z.
7. Increment i and continue with step 2.
For our experiments we use a simple generational GA [27] with two-point
crossover, no mutation, and tournament selection with replacement of size 2. For
the encoding of the bids we use the RK encoding. The tness of the individuals is the
resulting income. Due to the use of the RK encoding there are no invalid solutions and
no penalties have to be added to the tness of the individuals.
Figure 2 shows an example of the increasing tness of the GA-CAA for unstruc-
tured bids averaged over 50 runs. We plot the averaged best income of the auctioneer
over the number of generations and use a population size of N = 500. The plots show
a continuous improvement in the income of the auctioneer.
9















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Best tness (auctioneer’s income) in the process of the GA-CAA with 500
individuals for unstructured bids
5 Performance of the three CAP solution heuristics
To evaluate the performance of the three solution heuristics we simulated the CAs us-
ing the JAVA Agent Development Environment (JADE). All bidders and the auctioneer
are implemented as agents. After emitting a call for proposals the auctioneer collects
the bids submitted by the agents and calculates the optimal allocation according to the
chosen heuristic. The results of 50 simulation runs (auctions) per parameter setting are
logged and analyzed using SPSS3.
Our experimental setting tried to reach the optimal allocation of ISIP tasks in the
AM (qmax = 8) for four basic resources S = 4 and N = 24 time slots. The max-
imum resource request per BM of the agents was limited to qbmax = 3. Each agent
was allowed to submit four bids J = 4 of which only one could be allocated (XOR-
condition). Bids are generated with time slot occupancy probability ptso = 0.33. For
the calculation of the bid price we used pmin = 1 and pmax = 3. The number of
agents varies between I = 5 and = 100 in steps of 5 for each heuristics type as can be
seen in Figure 3.
The plots show that the auctioneer’s income increases with a larger number of
agents. This can be explained as the probability of nding a compact allocation in-
creases with the number of bids the auctioneer can choose from. More interestingly,
the auctioneer’s maximal revenue depends on the structure of the bids and increases
from unstructured over substructured to structured bids. A higher structure in the bids
allows the auctioneer to allocate the bids more efciently and to gain a higher revenue.
Table 5 to 7 summarizes the results of Figure 3 and compares the three differ-
ent optimization heuristics for 10 (Table 5), 50 (Table 6), and 100 (Table 7) bidding
agents. Comparing the maximal auctioneer’s revenue for different optimization heuris-
tic shows that the SG-CAA is outperformed by the SA-CAA and the GA-CAA. When
3SPSS Statistical Product and Service Solutions http://www.spss.com
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bid type income time perf. stdev.
SG
unstr. 887.28 0.007 1.00 74.86
substr. 991.82 0.011 1.12 127.89
str. 1123.04 0.011 1.27 162.74
SA
unstr. 960.22 48.334 1.08 68.15
substr. 1048.04 84.792 1.18 75.01
str. 1200.78 84.768 1.35 110.35
GA
unstr. 961.70 9.051 1.08 54.98
substr. 1082.50 15.067 1.22 63.77
str. 1269.04 13.455 1.43 89.80
Table 5: Performance of the SG / SA / GA CA-algorithm for 10 agents submitting four
bids measured in income and CPU time (sec) for 50 simulations
bid type income time perf. stdev.
SG
unstr. 1084.98 0.049 1.22 92.18
substr. 1291.08 0.092 1.46 99.94
str. 1602.72 0.089 1.81 110.11
SA
unstr. 1251.70 55.046 1.41 48.67
substr. 1447.08 92.369 1.63 62.78
str. 1718.22 92.481 1.94 76.38
GA
unstr. 1241.42 81.453 1.40 44.57
substr. 1474.16 139.999 1.66 50.08
str. 1766.82 132.324 1.99 74.12
Table 6: Performance of the SG / SA / GA CA-algorithm for 50 agents submitting four
bids measured in income and CPU time (sec) for 50 simulations
bid type income time perf. stdev.
SG
unstr. 1114.36 0.114 1.26 78.93
substr. 1393.32 0.207 1.57 79.35
str. 1831.66. 0.208 2.06 116.46
SA
unstr. 1302.32 63.335 1.47 47.61
substr. 1531.70 100.809 1.73 66.55
str. 1876.12 100.911 2.11 117.12
GA
unstr. 1282.91 189.512 1.45 55.59
substr. 1525.80 314.326 1.72 56.67
str. 1929.76 302.544 2.17 87.44
Table 7: Performance of the SG / SA / GA CA-algorithm for 100 agents submitting
four bids measured in income and CPU time (sec) for 50 simulations
11
SG Unstructured Bids






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Performance of the SG-CAA, SA-CAA and GA-CAA for unstructured, sub-
structured and structured bids. We show the auctioneer’s income over the number of
bidding agents.
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using the SA-CAA the auctioneer’s revenue is about 20% higher in comparison to
the SG-CAA. However, computing time increases up to a factor of 10 000. The GA-
CAA performs slightly better than the SA-CAA. However, this increase in perfor-
mance comes with higher computational effort.
6 Conclusions
In this work we developed three heuristics to solve the combinatorial auction problem.
The rst heuristic is based on a simple greedy allocation mechanism using the ratio of
bid price over the overall resource load. The second algorithm employs a simulated
annealing procedure to nd a high-quality allocation for the CAP making use of a
tness function which is solely based on the auctioneers income. The third heuristic,
a genetic algorithm, uses a random key encoding to represent the allocation quality
during the optimization process.
Comparing these three heuristics on three different problem instances, which are
related to resource allocation tasks in distributed information services and information
production environments, reveals that the greedy algorithm shows the lowest perfor-
mance. Although simulated annealing demands higher computational ressouces, it
performs considerably better for the three instances (unstructured, substructured and
structured bids) of our test set. The genetic algorithm performs best for the three test
types, however requires the highest computational effort. A further result of our exper-
iments is that the allocation quality increases with a higher number of bidding agents
and also when using better structured bids.
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